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This paper develops algorithms for dynamically consistent updating of ambiguous beliefs
in the maxmin expected utility model of decision making under ambiguity. Dynamic con-
sistency is the requirement that ex-ante contingent choices are respected by updated pref-
erences. Such updating, in this context, implies dependence on the feasible set of payoff
vectors available in the problem and/or on an ex-ante optimal act for the problem. Despite
this complication, the algorithms are formulated concisely and are easy to implement, thus
making dynamically consistent updating operational in the presence of ambiguity.
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A central task facing any theory of decision making under uncertainty is updating preferences in response to new infor-
mation (see e.g., [35]). Since updated preferences govern future choices, it is important to know how they relate to informa-
tion contingent choices made ex-ante. Dynamic consistency is the requirement that ex-ante contingent choices are respected
by updated preferences (see [10] for a formal deﬁnition of dynamic consistency and a detailed discussion of its relation to
other dynamic consistency concepts in the decision theory literature). This consistency is implicit in the standard way of
thinking about a dynamic choice problem as equivalent to a single ex-ante choice to which one is committed, and is thus
ubiquitous in decision analysis.
Under subjective expected utility (EU), updating preferences by applying Bayes’ rule to the subjective probability is the
standard way to update. Why is this so? Dynamic consistency is the primary justiﬁcation for Bayesian updating. Not only
does Bayesian updating imply dynamic consistency, but, if updating consists of specifying a conditional probability measure
for each (non-null) event, dynamic consistency implies these conditional measures must be the Bayesian updates. Even
under the view that Bayesian updating should be taken as given, this tells us that dynamic consistency comes ‘‘for free’’
under EU.
The study of dynamic consistency is in a well deﬁned sense the study of optimal updating, as dynamically consistent up-
date rules result in maximal (ex-ante) welfare. Moreover, since dynamic consistency leads to a well-established theory of
updating under expected utility, it makes sense to ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In a re-
cent paper [10], Hanany and Klibanoff pursued this strategy to update preferences of the max–min expected utility (MEU)
form [6]. For these preferences, beliefs are ambiguous in the sense that they are represented by a (compact and convex) set of. All rights reserved.
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generated by these measures. MEU preferences are widely used in modeling ambiguity averse behavior, as exempliﬁed by
the famous [3] paradoxes (for a survey of economic applications of MEU see [20]). The objective of this paper is to offer ways
to explicitly compute the decision maker’s (DM’s) updated beliefs according to the update rules suggested by Hanany and
Klibanoff [10], thus making these rules operational. For each rule, the updated ambiguous beliefs are computed using con-
structive algorithms. The algorithms we describe allow explicit implementation of these rules, for example via computer
programs. The rules allow the dynamically consistent updating of any set of MEU beliefs upon observing any non-null event.
These rules all are generalizations of Bayesian updating in the sense that they specialize to Bayes’ rule when the set of mea-
sures is a singleton. In common with Bayesian updating and many other models, our approach does not address preferences
conditional on completely unanticipated (i.e., null) events. Similarly, it does not consider costs, cognitive or otherwise, of
describing events. For a discussion of these and other aspects of dynamic decisions see, e.g., [9,19,25].
To better understand the issues involved in dynamically consistent updating under ambiguity, consider a version of
Ellsberg’s three-color problem. There is an urn containing 120 balls, 40 of which are known to be black (B) and 80 of
which are somehow divided between red (R) and yellow (Y), with no further information on the distribution. A ball is
to be drawn at random from the urn, and the DM faces a choice among bets paying off depending on the color of the
drawn ball. Any such bet may be written as a triple ðuB;uR;uYÞ 2 R3 where each ordinate represents the payoff if the
respective color is drawn. Typical preferences have (1,0,0) preferred to (0,1,0) and (0,1,1) preferred to (1,0,1), reﬂecting
a preference for the less ambiguous bets. Notice that these preferences entail a preference to bet on black over red when
no bet is made on yellow and a preference to bet on red over black when a bet is also made on yellow (thus violating the
sure-thing principle of EU). Now consider a simple dynamic version of this problem. In the dynamic version, there is an
interim information stage, where the DM is told whether or not the drawn ball was yellow. The DM is allowed to condi-
tion her choice of betting on black or red on this information. In the ﬁrst choice pair, the bet on black or red is not paired
with a bet on yellow, so the choice ‘‘Bet on B’’ leads to the payoff vector (1,0,0) while the choice ‘‘Bet on R’’ leads to pay-
offs (0,1,0). In the second choice pair, a bet on yellow is included, so the choice ‘‘Bet on B’’ leads to the payoff vector
(1,0,1) while the choice ‘‘Bet on R’’ leads to payoffs (0,1,1). Since the DM can condition on whether or not a yellow ball
is drawn, the complete set of pure strategies available in each choice problem is: (‘‘Bet on B’’ if not Y; ‘‘Bet on B’’ if Y), (‘‘Bet
on B’’ if not Y; ‘‘Bet on R’’ if Y), (‘‘Bet on R’’ if not Y; ‘‘Bet on B’’ if Y), (‘‘Bet on R’’ if not Y; ‘‘Bet on R’’ if Y). Notice that when
translated into payoff vectors, these strategies yield only {(1,0,0), (0,1,0)} in the ﬁrst choice problem and {(1,0,1), (0,1,1)}
in the second choice problem. If payoff vectors are what the DM cares about, then this provides a strong argument that
choices in the dynamic version of the Ellsberg problem should be the same as in the original problem since the feasible
payoff vectors are the same. This is closely related to ensuring that the value of information is always non-negative, an-
other desirable principle for decision making (see, e.g., [30]). If choices in the dynamic version of the problem differed
from those in the original problem (where the choices are made before the information is revealed) then the DM would
strictly prefer to face the original problem, thus declining the (free) information.
What kind of rules for updating ambiguous beliefs imply that the choices in the dynamic version are the same as in the
original problem (not only for this example, but in general)? In [10] we provide such rules, and also show that any such
rules must depend on the feasible set of payoff vectors available in the problem and/or on an ex-ante optimal act for the
problem. To make this clear, consider the following speciﬁcation of MEU preferences that allow the Ellsberg choices in the
example above. For any MEU preference over payoff vectors in R3, there exists a compact and convex set of probability
measures, C, over the three colors and a utility function, u : R! R, such that 8f ; g 2 R3; f % h ()minq2C
R ðu  f ÞdqP
minq2C
R ðu  hÞdq. Let u(x) = x for all x 2 R and let C ¼ 13 ;a; 23 a ja 2 14 ; 512  , a set of measures symmetric with respect
to the probabilities of red and yellow and consistent with the information that 40 of the 120 balls are black. Observe that,
indeed, (1,0,0) is preferred to (0,1,0) and (0,1,1) is preferred to (1,0,1) according to these preferences. If we apply full
Bayesian updating (Bayesian conditioning of each measure in C) conditional on the event E = {B,R}, the updated set of mea-
sures is CE ¼ ða;1 a;0Þja 2 49 ; 47
  
. According to these updated preferences, ‘‘Bet on B’’ is strictly preferred to ‘‘Bet on R’’
conditional on learning E = {B,R}, leading (1,0,0) to be selected over (0,1,0) in choice problem 1, in agreement with the
unconditional preferences, but also leading (1,0,1) to be selected over (0,1,1) in choice problem 2, in conﬂict with the
unconditional preferences. It follows that for an update rule to maintain the choices according to the unconditional pref-
erences for both choice problems, the rule must depend on the feasible set and/or on an ex-ante optimal act. A dynam-
ically consistent update in this example corresponds to Bayesian updating of measures in a particular strict subset of the
ex-ante set of measures, speciﬁcally the conditional set of measures is C1E ¼ ða;1 a;0Þja 2 12 ; 47
  
for choice problem 1
and C2E ¼ a;1 a;0ð Þja 2f 49 ; 12
 g in choice problem 2. This emphasizes that although natural analogues to updating beliefs
under EU exist for updating beliefs under ambiguity, dynamic consistency requires novel procedures that operate some-
what differently.
The prior literature on updating ambiguous beliefs in MEU proposes and explores rules that, in fact, fail dynamic consis-
tency for at least some MEU preferences. This literature includes many well-known rules, such as full (or generalized) Bayes-
ian updating, maximum likelihood updating, or Dempster–Shafer updating. Full Bayesian updating calls for updating each
measure in a set of priors according to Bayes’ rule (see [13,14,5,34,32,24,23,28,33,4], for papers suggesting, deriving or char-
acterizing this update rule in various settings). Maximum likelihood updating says that, of the set of priors, only those mea-
sures assigning the highest probability to the observed event should be updated using Bayes’ rule, and the other priors
should be discarded (see [7]). Kriegler [17] advocates a hybrid approach applying full Bayesian updating to a set of measures
1200 E. Hanany et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1198–1214formed through e -contamination where additionally e is updated through a maximum likelihood procedure. Both full
Bayesian and maximum likelihood updating are given an interpretation in terms of epistemic belief hierarchies by Walliser
and Zwirn [31]. For Dempster–Shafer updating see [2,27]. Jaffray [15] suggests that the inconsistency between unconditional
and conditional preferences might be resolved in a way that is a compromise between the different preferences. He examines
a selection criterion that chooses a plan that is ‘‘not too bad’’ in a utility sense according to any of these preferences and is not
dominated in that no feasible plan is better according to all the preferences. Nielsen and Jaffray [22] construct algorithms for
implementing the approach suggested by Jaffray [15] in the context of risk.
In contrast to this literature, Hanany and Klibanoff [10] identify update rules that are dynamically consistent for any MEU
preferences upon observing any non-null event. Given the necessary dependence of the consistent rules on the feasible set
and/or an ex-ante optimal act, the practicality of their implementation is an issue. This motivates the present paper, where
we provide algorithms for computing the updated beliefs determined by these consistent rules. In developing the algorithms
and proving that they implement the various rules, we draw on techniques from convex analysis.
In the next section we describe the framework for our analysis. Section 3 describes algorithms to compute updated be-
liefs. Section 4 provides a short summary. Proofs are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B collects some useful results from
polyhedral theory. Code for an implementation of the algorithms in the paper using Wolfram Mathematica is available as an
Online Supplement on the journal webpage or from the authors.
2. Framework
Consider the set X of all simple (i.e., ﬁnite-support) lotteries over a set of consequences Z, a ﬁnite set of states of nature S
endowed with the algebra R of all events, and the set A of all acts, i.e. functions f : S? X. Consider a non-degenerate max–
min expected utility (MEU, [6]) preference relation % over A, for which there exists a compact and convex set of probability
measures with a ﬁnite set of extreme points, C, and a vonNeumann–Morgenstern (vN–M) EU function, u : X ! R, such that
8f ; h 2 A; f % h () minq2C
R ðu  f ÞdqPminq2C R ðu  hÞdq. Let PMEU denote the set of all such preference relations. If % is
non-degenerate, C is unique and u is unique (among vN–M EU functions) up to positive afﬁne transformations. As usual,
 and  denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of %.
Let Nð%Þ denote the set of events E 2 R for which "q 2 C, q(E) > 0. We limit attention to updating on events that are non-
null in this sense. For E 2 R, let D(E) denote the set of all probability measures on R giving weight 0 to Ec. For any q 2 D(S)
with q(E) > 0, we denote by qE 2 D(E) the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning of q on E.
Let B denote the set of all non-empty subsets of acts B#A such that B is convex (with respect to the usual [1] mixtures)
and compact with a ﬁnite set of extreme points. Elements of B are considered feasible sets and their convexity could be jus-
tiﬁed, for example, by randomization over acts. Compactness is needed to ensure the existence of optimal acts.
Assume a preference % 2 PMEU , an event E 2 Nð%Þ and an act g 2 A chosen according to % from a feasible set B 2 B before
the realization of E (i.e., g % f , for all f 2 B). Denote by T the set of all such quadruples ð%; E; g;BÞ. An update rule is a function
U : T ! PMEU , producing for each ð%; E; g;BÞ 2 T a MEU conditional preference, denoted %E;g;B, representable using the same
(up to normalization) vN–M utility function u as % and a non-empty, closed and convex set of conditional measures
CE,g,B # CE  {qEjq 2 C}, with a ﬁnite set of extreme points. Such a conditional preference is viewed as governing choice upon
the realization of the conditioning event E. Let UBayes denote the set of all such update rules.
Abusing notation in the standard way, x 2 X is also used to denote the constant act for which "s 2 S, f(s) = x. For any
f ; h 2 A, we use fEh to denote the act equal to f on E and h on Ec, the complement of E. General vectors in RjSj will be
called utility acts. If a and b are utility acts, we use aEb to denote the utility act equal to a on E and b on Ec. Since S is
ﬁnite, we sometimes identify probability measures with vectors in RjSj normalized to sum to 1. For an arbitrary convex,
compact set of real vectors, A, denote by ext(A) the set of extreme points of A. Let C ¼ extðCÞ and B ¼ extðu  BÞ, thus
C ¼ coðCÞ and u  B ¼ coðBÞ, where co denotes the convex hull operator. This implies that CE is the convex hull of a ﬁnite
number of points. For each a 2 RjSj and n 2 R, denote the half-space fc 2 RjSjja  c P ng by Wna and the hyperplane
fc 2 RjSjja  c ¼ ng by Hna.
As discussed in the introduction, the update rules considered in this paper depend on an initially optimal act g and the
feasible set B. Before introducing update rules, we describe a simple algorithm for computing an initially optimal act.
Algorithm 2.1. Solve the linear program,o; kð Þ 2 arg max
ðo;kÞ2R	½0;1
jBj
o;
s:t:P
s2S
P
a2B
kaasqs P o; 8q 2 C;P
a2B
ka ¼ 1:
ðPÞLet b ¼Pa2Bkaa and g 2 B such that b = u  g.
Fig. 2.1. The set of probability measures C for our leading example (see Example 2.1). Updating of C must result in a subset of D(E).
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The following example will be used throughout the paper to demonstrate our results.
Example 2.1. Consider a state space S = {1,2,3,4} and two investment options l, n leading to state contingent monetary
payments (5,5,20,20) and (10,15,10,15), respectively. For simplicity, assume risk neutrality and take utility u over
monetary outcomes in Z ¼ R to be the identity function (our analysis applies to any assumption on risk attitudes). The
ambiguous beliefs on the state space are represented by the set C = co{(0.4,0.4,0.1,0.1), (0.1,0.4,0.25,0.25), (0.4,0.1,0.25,
0.25)}. Before investing, it is possible to pay a cost of 1 to reveal whether the event E = {1,2} is true and make an investment
decision based on this information. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the sets C and D(E) within the simplex of all probability measures over
S. Thus, before randomization, there are seven feasible alternatives: the two investment options l, n without buying the
information, the non-investment option and four information contingent investment possibilities. This is summarized by the
feasible utility set u  B = co{(5,5,20,20), (10,15,10,15), (0,0,0,0), (6,6,19,19), (9,16,9,16), (6,6,9,16),
(9,16,19,19)}. Applying Algorithm 2.1 results in an optimum o⁄ = 1 and k⁄ = (0,0,0,0,0,0,1), i.e. buy the information and
invest in n if E and in l if not E. Note that b = u  g = (9,16,19,19), evaluated by minq2C
P
s2Sbsqs ¼ 1. In the next section we
analyze the updated ambiguous beliefs in this problem. Throughout the paper we analyze the case where E is observed –
similar analysis, omitted for brevity, can be done for the case where Ec is observed.3. Computing updated beliefs
3.1. Dynamically consistent update rules
Dynamic consistency, an important and intuitive property of update rules, means that initial contingent plans should be
respected after receiving information. In our framework, the act g should remain optimal also conditionally.
Axiom 3.1. DC (Dynamic consistency). For any ð%; E; g; BÞ 2 T , if f 2 B with f = g on Ec, then g %E;g;B f .
Observe that conditional optimality of g is checked against all feasible acts f such that f = g on Ec. Why check conditional
optimality only against these acts? Consider an environment where the DM has a ﬁxed budget to allocate across bets on var-
ious events. It would be nonsensical (and would violate payoff dominance on the realized event) to require that the ex-ante
optimal allocation of bets remained better than placing all of one’s bets on the realized event. This justiﬁes the restriction of
the conditional comparisons to acts that could feasibly agree on Ec. An act f = g on Ec will be called comparable to g.
Among rules satisfying desiderata such as dynamic consistency, there are those that are most conservative in the sense of
maintaining the most ambiguity in the process of updating. In general, this means that the updated set of measures should
be the largest possible subset of CE, in the sense of set inclusion, while still satisfying the desiderata. Examining such rules is
particularly illuminating because they reveal the precise extent to which dynamic consistency forces the DM to eliminate
measures present in the unconditional set when updating. If, for example, one views full Bayesian updating (updating all
measures in the initial set) as ‘‘the right thing to do’’ then examining these rules shows how far one must depart from this
to maintain consistency. Note that if dynamic consistency is ignored, and all rules in UBayes are considered, ambiguity max-
imization would uniquely select full Bayesian updating.
Let us now observe the implications of DC for updating. The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of up-
dated beliefs under the unique ambiguity maximizing update rule (denoted UDCmax) within the dynamically consistent rules
in UBayes. Having found an initially optimal act g in Step 3.1.A, the algorithm computes in Step 3.1.B the set of feasible utility
acts comparable to g. Step 3.1.C computes Bayesian conditional measures normal to hyperplanes supporting this set at g.
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algorithm at this point and return coðQEÞ, this would be a dynamically consistent update rule but need not maximize ambi-
guity. To maximize ambiguity, Step 3.1.D ﬁnds the minimum evaluation of g according to these measures, and computes the
updated beliefs as the set of conditional measures that evaluate g at least as high as this minimum.
Algorithm 3.1.
Step 3.1.A: Compute b = u  g and o ¼minq2C
P
s2Sbsqs.
1
Step 3.1.B: Compute L  ext coðBÞ\s2EcHbsIðsÞ
h i
, where IðsÞ 2 RjSj denotes an s-indicator, i.e. Is(s) = 1 and Is^ðsÞ ¼ 0 for s^– s.2
Step 3.1.C: Compute QE  ext coðCEÞ\a2LW0ba
h i
, where CE  extðCEÞ.
Step 3.1.D: Compute UE  ext coðCEÞ \W0bb11
h i
, where b1 minq2QE
P
s2Sbsqs and 1 denotes the constant ð1; . . . ;1Þ 2 RjSj.
Return coðUEÞ.Proposition 3.1. Algorithm 3.1 results in the updated set of measures, CE,g,B, produced by the update rule UDCmax.Example 3.1. We apply the algorithm to our leading example. Since we already have an optimal utility act b = (9,16,19,19)
and its value o⁄ = 1, we start by ﬁnding the set L, the extreme points of the set of feasible acts comparable to g. The set of
extreme points of coðBÞ \ H19Ið3Þ is {(9,16,19,19), (6,6,19,19), (4.75,4.75,19,19)}. Then intersecting with H19Ið4Þ leaves
this set unchanged, so this is L. Note that this set includes the optimal utility act b, the utility act corresponding to the choice
of buying the information and investing always in l, and the utility act (4.75,4.75,19,19) resulting from a convex com-
bination of the no investment option and investing in l without buying the information. Next we ﬁnd the set CE, the extreme
points of the set obtained by Bayesian conditioning of all measures in C (see the top part of Fig. 3.1). The conditionals of the
measures in C are {(0.5,0.5,0,0), (0.2,0.8,0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}. Since the ﬁrst of these conditionals is in the convex hull of the
other two, CE ¼ fð0:2;0:8; 0;0Þ; ð0:8;0:2;0;0Þg. Notice that if one adopted this set as the updated ambiguous beliefs, i.e.
followed the full Bayesian rule, the optimal choice given E would be not to follow the optimal act and instead invest in l.
This would result in the utility act (6,6,19,19), which is dominated (in every state) by the feasible act invest in l without
buying the information. This demonstrates that full Bayesian updating may be an undesirable update rule. In contrast, UDCmax
is dynamically consistent, and thus does not suffer from such phenomena. To see this, we continue to follow the algorithm
and next ﬁnd QE, the extreme points of the set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of g. Since j L j¼ 3; co CE
 	
is intersected thrice, to ensure measures that support the feasible set comparable to g. Since b is always an element of L and
b  b = 0, the intersection based on b never imposes any restriction. Considering b ð6;6;19;19Þ ¼
ð15;10;0;0Þ; W0ð15;10;0;0Þ corresponds to the set of measures such that 15q1  10q2P 0 (see the middle part of Fig. 3.1),
so the set of extreme points of coðCEÞ \W0ð15;10;0;0Þis {(0.4,0.6,0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}. The ﬁnal intersection, with
W0ð13:75;11:25;0;0Þ, requires 13.75q1  11.25q2P 0 and thus shrinks the set of extreme points to {(0.45,0.55,
0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}, which is QE (see the bottom part of Fig. 3.1). Note that any conditional measure putting weight lower than
0.45 to state 1 does not support the conditional optimality of g because it becomes worse than (4.75,4.75,19,19). Finally
we calculate UE, the set of extreme points of the set of updated ambiguous beliefs. Observe that b1 = min{(9,-
16,19,19)  (0.45,0.55,0,0), (9,16,19,19)  (0.8,0.2,0,0)} = 4.75. Since q 2 co CE
 	
; ðb b11Þ  qP 0 if and only if
13.75q1  11.25q2P 0, which is not weaker than the restrictions already imposed, so UE  co CE
 	
\W0bb11 ¼ QE. Thus
CE,g,B = co{(0.45,0.55,0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}. Note that given these updated ambiguous beliefs, the optimal act is conditionally
equivalent to 4.75, which is better than 6, the payment if one invests instead in l. Thus dynamic consistency is satisﬁed.
The example shows that it is necessary to eliminate some of the measures in the original set, in particular all measures that
conditionally give weight lower than 0.45 to state 1. When a plan is made initially to follow the optimal act, the updated
ambiguous beliefs represented by CE,g,B justify this plan: contingent on learning E, it will be optimal to carry it out.
Note that computing the updated ambiguous beliefs is a hard problem because it involves computing the extreme points
of intersections of convex hulls of ﬁnite sets of points, which is known to be hard. If these computations could be done
efﬁciently, then all the algorithms in this paper would be polynomial in the size of the problem.
It is also worth noting that in cases where the feasible set has a special structure such that f ; f 0 2 B) fEf 0 2 B, the
restriction f = g on Ec in the statement of DC is superﬂuous, thus the computation of Step 3.1.B can be simpliﬁed to
L  fa 2 Bja ¼ b on Ecg. Such feasible sets arise, for example, whenever one starts from a decision tree with branches1 If g is not known, one can apply Algorithm 2.1 to carry out this step.
2 When computing the extreme points of the intersection of a list of hyperplanes/half-spaces with the convex hull of a ﬁnite set of points, this algorithm and
all subsequent ones use standard procedures from polyhedral theory (e.g., as in Appendix B) and thus we do not detail these procedures here.
Fig. 3.1. Illustration of Algorithm 3.1 for computing the update rule UDCmax (see Example 3.1).
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is feasible conditional on Ec, denoted BE
c
, and then combining the two so that B ¼ h 2 Ajh ¼f
fEf 0 for some f 2 BE; f 0 2 BE
cg.
3.2. More robust dynamic consistency
It may be desirable to strengthen dynamic consistency, so that all initially optimal acts comparable to g should remain
optimal conditional on E.
Axiom 3.2 PFI (Robust dynamic consistency)3. For any ð%; E; g;BÞ 2 T , if f 2 B with f = g on Ec and f  g, then f E,g,B g.
The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of updated beliefs under the unique ambiguity maximizing up-
date rule (denoted UDC\PFImax) within the rules in UBayes satisfying DC and PFI. As in Algorithm 3.1, Steps 3.2.A and 3.2.B ﬁnd
an initially optimal act g, the set of feasible acts comparable to g and the set of measures supporting the conditional opti-
mality of g. Step 3.2.C computes the measures normal to hyperplanes separating the feasible acts comparable to g from
the acts strictly better than g. Step 3.2.D uses one of these measures to compute the set of initially optimal acts comparable
to g. Step 3.2.E computes the Bayesian conditional measures normal to hyperplanes supporting this set at g. Only these mea-
sures can be used to evaluate g conditionally if robust dynamic consistency is required. To maximize ambiguity, Step 3.2.F
ﬁnds the minimum evaluation of g according to these measures, and computes the updated beliefs as the set of conditional
measures that evaluate all initially optimal acts at least as high as this minimum.3 This axiom was named PFI (Preservation of Feasible Optimal Indifference) by Hanany and Klibanoff [10]. We call it robust dynamic consistency here, as upon
reﬂection, this seems a more informative name. To maintain continuity with our earlier nomenclature we will nonetheless continue to refer to it by the initials
PFI.
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Step 3.2.A: Compute b = u  g and o⁄ as in Step 3.1.A of Algorithm 3.1.
Step 3.2.B: Compute L; QE as in Steps 3.1.B and 3.1.C of Algorithm 3.1, respectively.
Step 3.2.C: Compute R  ext coðCÞ \ Hob \a2LW0ba
h i
.
Step 3.2.D: Compute J  ext co L  \ Hoqg\q2CW0qqgh i, where qg 2 R.
Step 3.2.E: Compute KE  ext co QE
 	
\a2JH0ba
h i
.
Step 3.2.F: Compute UE  ext co CE
 	
\a2JW0ab21
h i
, where b2  minq2KE
P
s2Sbsqs. Return co UE
 
.Proposition 3.2. Algorithm 3.2 results in the updated set of measures, CE,g,B, produced by the update rule UDC\PFImax.
The following example serves to demonstrate the comparative robustness of updating under PFI and DC, as compared to
updating under only DC. It also illustrates the algorithm above.
Example 3.2. We apply the algorithm to our leading example. It can be veriﬁed that the optimum found using Algorithm 2.1
is unique, thus PFI has no bite. Therefore we modify the example slightly and assume that the cost of buying the information
is 2. Applying Algorithm 2.1 again, the previous optimal act – buy the information and invest in n if E and in l if not E –
remains optimal. With the new cost, this is an optimal utility act b = (8,17,18,18) with optimal value o⁄ = 0. The set of
feasible utility acts comparable to g now has the extreme points L ¼ fð8;17;18;18Þ; ð7;7;18;18Þ; ð4:5;4:5;18;18Þg.
The set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of g now has the extreme points QE ¼ fð0:5;0:5;0;0Þ;
ð0:8;0:2;0;0Þg (see the top part of Fig. 3.2). Note that the change in L caused a change in QE. In particular, any conditional
measure putting weight less than 0.5 to state 1 now does not support the conditional optimality of g because it becomes
worse than (4.5,4.5,18,18). Observe that coðCÞ \ Hob ¼ fð0:4;0:4;0:1;0:1Þg, so R ¼ fqgg ¼ fð0:4;0:4;0:1;0:1Þg. Next we
ﬁnd J, the extreme points of the initially optimal acts comparable to g. The intersection coðLÞ \ Hoqg results in the extreme
points {(8,17,18,18), (4.5,4.5,18,18)}. Since j C j¼ 3, we need 3 more intersections, which leave the set unchanged, so
this is J. Note that the second extreme point of the initially optimal acts results from a convex combination of the no
investment option and investing in l without buying the information. We move on to compute KE, the extreme points of the
set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of all initially optimal acts comparable to g. Since j J j¼ 2 but the
intersection based on b 2 J never imposes any restriction, we intersect QE once, which leads to KE ¼ fð0:5;0:5; 0;0Þg (see the
top part of Fig. 3.2). Finally, we compute UE, the set of extreme points of the set of updated beliefs. Observe that
b2 = min{(8,17,18,18)  (0.5,0.5,0,0)} = 4.5. Intersecting coðCEÞ with W0ab21 for each a 2 J leads to UE ¼ QE (see the
bottom part of Fig. 3.2). Thus the updated ambiguous beliefs under UDC\PFImax are CE,g,B = co{(0.5,0.5,0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}.
Applying Algorithm 3.1 to compute the updated ambiguous beliefs under UDCmax for this example gives the same set CE,g,B. To
see the comparative robustness of updating under PFI and DC, consider the updated ambiguous beliefs given a differentFig. 3.2. Illustration of Algorithm 3.2 for computing the update rule UDC\PFImax (see Example 3.2).
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same as above because this rule guarantees that all initially optimal acts in co{(8,17,18,18), (4.5,4.5,18,18)} remain
optimal conditionally. However, UDCmax for this case coincides with full Bayesian updating, i.e. results in more conditional
measures in the updated set compared to the case with the former initially optimal act. This additional ambiguity would
have affected the conditional optimality of the utility act (8,17,18,18), while none of it affects the conditional optimality of
(4.5,4.5,18,18) due to the constancy on E. Incidentally, for UDCmax with the initially optimal act (4.5,4.5,18,18), in
contrast to Example 3.1, Step 3.1.D has an effect: it expands the updated set from coðQEÞ ¼ cofð0:2;0:8;0; 0Þ; ð0:5;0:5; 0;0Þg
(see the top part of Fig. 3.2) to coðUEÞ ¼ cofð0:2;0:8;0;0Þ; ð0:8;0:2;0;0Þg.3.3. Reference dependent updating
Consider an additional condition which, in the presence of DC, implies PFI and is stronger than PFI only for infeasible acts.
Axiom 3.3. RA (g as a reference act). For any ð%; E; g;BÞ 2 T , if f 2 A with f = g on Ec and f  g, then f %E;g;B g.
One way of viewing RA is as saying that updating must preserve or increase ambiguity affecting g more than ambiguity
affecting any act f indifferent and comparable to g.4 RA has the advantage of simplifying the updated beliefs in the following
important special case. When the initially optimal act g is constant (in utilities) on Ec, we can use a simple threshold rule based
on the probability each measure assigns to E to obtain the updated set. It follows that a sufﬁcient condition for the threshold
rule to apply occurs when Ec is a singleton, i.e., information is learned one state at a time, a not uncommon occurrence.
The strengthening of PFI to RA does not follow from dynamic consistency considerations, however the condition does not
seem unreasonable and has the above-mentioned simpliﬁcation as its main virtue. In RA, the part of the indifference curve
through g agreeing with g on Ec is picked out for a special role in updating. This part of the indifference curve may be thought
of as the portion where g is being used as a reference act. The axiom requires that g occupy an extremal position in the con-
ditional preference relative to the other elements of this part of the (unconditional) indifference curve (through g) consisting
of acts agreeing with g on Ec.
The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of updated beliefs in this special case under the unique ambiguity
maximizing update rule (denoted UDC\RAmax) within the rules in UBayes satisfying DC and RA. The key new step that provides
the simpliﬁcation to a threshold rule is Step 3.3.D. This step selects the measures to update by comparing the weight they
give to Ewith qg(E) and updates all measures giving weakly more weight than qg(E) (if u  g > o⁄ on Ec), weakly less weight (if
u  g < o⁄ on Ec) or all measures in C (if u  g = o⁄ on Ec).
Algorithm 3.3
Step 3.3.A: Compute b = u  g and o⁄ as in Step 3.1.A of Algorithm 3.1.
Step 3.3.B: Compute L; R as in Step 3.1.B of Algorithm 3.1 and Step 3.2.C of Algorithm 3.2, respectively.
Step 3.3.C: Compute qgE 2 argminfqE jq2Rg
P
s2EbsðqEÞs. Let qg 2 R such that qgE is its Bayesian conditional on E.
Step 3.3.D: Compute UE  ext qEjq 2 coðCÞ \Waq
g ðEÞ
a
P
s2EIðsÞ

  
, where a  sign[b(Ec)  o⁄]; return coðUEÞ.Example 3.3. We apply this algorithm also to our leading example. Assume again that the cost of buying the information is
2. Recall the optimal act g = (8,17,18,18) with optimal value o⁄ = 0 and the measure in R ¼ fqgg ¼ fð0:4;0:4;0:1;0:1Þg,
which uniquely separates the feasible acts comparable to g from the acts preferred to g (see Fig. 3.3). Note that u  g is con-
stant on Ec. Since signð18 oÞ ¼ 1; Waqg ðEÞ
a
P
s2EIðsÞ
is equivalent to the condition q(E)P qg(E). The unique measure in coðCÞ satis-
fying this condition is qg, thus UE includes only its Bayesian conditional. Therefore the updated beliefs are represented by
CE,g,B = {(0.5,0.5,0,0)}. In general, the updated beliefs are not necessarily reduced to a single measure. For example, consider
the optimal act g = (0,0,0,0). Since g is constant on Ec and signð0 oÞ ¼ 0; UE ¼ CE. Thus the updated beliefs coincide with
those obtained by the full Bayesian update rule, i.e. CE,g,B = {(0.2,0.8,0,0), (0.8,0.2,0,0)}.
In fact, the algorithm producing the threshold rule is valid somewhat more generally than suggested above. It works
whenever there is no ambiguity about the conditional expectation of g on Ec, in the sense that the initially optimal act g
has the same conditional EU on Ec according to each measure in C giving positive probability to Ec.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that uðXÞ ¼ R and REc bdqEc is the same for all q 2 C with q(Ec) > 0. Algorithm 3.3, with b(Ec) replaced byR
Ec bdqEc if there exists q 2 C with q(Ec) > 0 and replaced by o⁄ otherwise, results in the updated set of measures, CE,g,B, produced by
the update rule UDC\RAmax.4 An alternative strengthening of PFI is obtained by replacing f %E;g;B g with g %E;g;B f in RA. However, a small modiﬁcation of the example in the proof of
Proposition 13 in [10] can be used to show there is no update rule in UBayes satisfying the alternative condition (and in fact, no such rule exists in the larger
family of update rules that allows updating measures outside C).
Fig. 3.3. Illustration of Algorithm 3.3 for computing the update rule UDC\RAmax (see Example 3.3).
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singleton, as demonstrated in the following example.
Example 3.4. Let Z ¼ R; C ¼ 824 ; 1024 ; 424 ; 224
 
; 524 ;
4
24 ;
10
24 ;
5
24
  
; B ¼ ð2;1;3;0Þ; ð0;3;3;0Þf g and E = {1,2}. For the unique initially
optimal act, b = u  g = (0,3,3,0) and o ¼ 2112. Note that uðXÞ ¼ R and for all q 2 C, q(Ec) > 0 and
R
Ec bdqEc ¼ 2. Applying
Algorithm 3.3, L ¼ B and R ¼ 824 ; 1024 ; 424 ; 224
 
; 312 ;
3
12 ;
4
12 ;
2
12
  
(note that argminq2C
P
s2Sbsqs ¼ C). Then we compute
minfqE jq2Rg
P
s2EbsðqEÞs ¼ 1:5 and qg ¼ 312 ; 312 ; 412 ; 212
 
. Since sign(2  o⁄) = 1, we intersect coðCÞ with q(E)P qg(E), resulting in
8
24 ;
10
24 ;
4
24 ;
2
24
 
; 624 ;
6
24 ;
8
24 ;
10
24
  
, and compute the Bayesian conditionals to ﬁnd UE. Thus the updated ambiguous beliefs are
represented by CE;g;B ¼ co 49 ; 59 ;0;0
 
; 12 ;
1
2 ;0;0
  
.
For completeness, in Appendix A we provide a modiﬁcation of Step 3.3.D that we show allows computation of the up-
dated beliefs under UDC\RAmax for the general case. To compute the extreme points of the updated beliefs, this modiﬁcation
considers pairs of extreme points of C and selects zero, one or two points from their convex hull to update.
4. Summary
This paper develops algorithms for updating ambiguous beliefs in the MEU model of decision making under ambiguity.
The update rules all satisfy the desirable property of dynamic consistency as was shown in [10]. Some of the rules also satisfy
stronger and more robust consistency requirements as well. The algorithms are formulated concisely and are easy to imple-
ment, thus making dynamically consistent updating operational in the presence of ambiguity.
We close by mentioning two possible directions for future research. First, the algorithms in this paper deal only with ﬁ-
nitely generated sets of beliefs and feasible acts. The question of whether these algorithms can be used to approximate
dynamically consistent updating for arbitrary convex sets of beliefs or feasible acts is left open.
Second, although MEU is a popular theory of decision making with ambiguity aversion, it is far from the only one (see,
among many, [12,16,18,21,26,29]). In [11] we expand the approach in [10] to characterize dynamically consistent update
rules for a very broad class of ambiguity averse preferences. Algorithmic implementation in these more general settings
is left open as well.
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Appendix A. Proofs and auxiliary lemmata
To conserve space in this appendix, whenever we refer to [10], we use the abbreviation HK.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let q 2 C satisfyPs2Sbsqs ¼ o. For every a 2 B, there exists f 2 B such that a = u  f, so g exists by
convexity of u  B. Moreover, g is optimal, otherwise there exists g 2 B and k 2 ½0;1
jBj such that u  g ¼Pa2Bkaas and
o  minq2C
P
s2Su½gðsÞ
qs > minq2C
P
s2Su½gðsÞ
qs, thus o >
P
s2S
P
a2Bk

aasq

s ¼ o in contradiction to the maximality of o⁄. h
E. Hanany et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1198–1214 1207Proof of Proposition 3.1. HK showed (p. 270, Corollary 1) that UDCmax is deﬁned by CE,g,B = {qEjq 2 C andR ðu  gÞdqE Pminp2QE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdpg, where QE;g;BE is the set of Bayesian conditionals on E of QE,g,B, the measures in C supporting
the conditional optimality of g, deﬁned by QE;g;B  fq 2 Cj R ðu  gÞdqE P R ðu  f ÞdqE for all f 2 B with f = g on Ec}. Since the
hyperplanes used in Step 3.1.B are c 2 RjSjcs ¼ bs
 
; coðLÞ ¼ u  ff 2 Bjf ¼ g on Ec}. By deﬁnition, QE;g;BE is the intersection of
CE and all sets of the form q 2 CEj
P
s2Sðbs  asÞqs P 0
 
where a 2 u  {f 2 Bjf = g on Ec}, thus QE;g;BE ¼ coðQEÞ. The fact that it
sufﬁces to apply a ﬁnite number of intersections (8a 2 L and not "a 2 u  {f 2 Bjf = g on Ec}) follows from Proposition A.1
below. Finally, by deﬁnition of UDCmax, CE,g,B is the set q 2 CEj
P
s2S bs  b1ð Þqs P 0
 
. h
The following proposition shows that algorithms for computing the intersection of a compact, convex set with a ﬁnite
number of half-spaces or hyperplanes (see e.g. Algorithm B.2 in Appendix B) can also be used to compute the intersection
of such a set with an inﬁnite number of half-spaces/hyperplanes, when the latter are deﬁned by normals taken from a com-
pact, convex set having a ﬁnite number of extreme points.
Proposition A.1. Fix n 2 R. Let A;D  RjSj be convex, compact sets, each with a ﬁnite number of extreme points. Denote ext(D) by
fakgrk¼1. Thenext A
\r
k¼1
Wnak
 !
¼ ext A
\
a2D
Wna
 !
:The same is true when substituting Wna with H
n
a.Proof. Let Dn(a) = {c 2 Ajc  aP n}. By deﬁnition, ATa2DWna ¼ Ta2DDnðaÞ and ATrk¼1Wna ¼ Trk¼1DnðakÞ, so it remains to show thatT
a2DD
nðaÞ ¼ Trk¼1DnðakÞ. Since ak rk¼1#D; Ta2DDnðaÞ#Trk¼1DnðakÞ. On the other hand, let c 2 Trk¼1DnðakÞ. Then "k = 1, . . . ,r,
c  akP n. Let a 2 D, so a ¼Prk¼1kkak where kk 2 0;1½ 
; Prk¼1kr ¼ 1. Then c  a ¼ c Prk¼1kkak ¼Prk¼1kk c  ak PPrk¼1kkn ¼ n,
hence c 2Ta2DDn(a), i.e. Trk¼1DnðakÞ#Ta2DDnðaÞ. The same arguments hold when substitutingWna with Hna andPwith =. h
To show that Algorithm 3.2 provides the desired updated beliefs, the following notation is useful.
Notation A.1. Given E and h 2 B, deﬁne the set of feasible acts comparable and indifferent to h to beJhB ¼ ff 2 Bjf  h and f ¼ h on Ecg:Proof of Proposition 3.2. HK showed (p.276, Proposition 5) that UDC\PFImax is deﬁned by CE;g;B ¼
qE j q 2 C and
R ðu  f ÞdqE Pminp2KE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdp for all f 2 JgBn o, where KE;g;BE is the set of Bayesian conditionals on E of KE,g,B,
the measures supporting the conditional optimality of all acts initially optimal and comparable to g, deﬁned by
KE;g;B  q 2 Cj R ðu  gÞdqE P R ðu  f ÞdqE for all f 2 B with f ¼ g on Ec and R ðu  gÞdqE ¼ R ðu  f ÞdqE if ; in addition; f  g .
We ﬁrst show that u  JgB ¼ a 2 u  Bja ¼ bf on Ec; minq2C
P
s2Sasqs ¼ o ¼
P
s2Sasq
g
s , where qg 2 QE;g;B \ argminq2C
P
s2Sbsqs
o
(see the proof of Proposition 3.1 for the deﬁnition of QE,g,B). To see this, note that if ais an element of the r.h.s then
a 2 u  JgB, because a 2 u  {f 2 Bjf = g on Ec} and minq2C
P
s2Sasqs ¼minq2C
P
s2Sbsqs. For the other direction, suppose a 2 u  JgB.
Existence of qg 2 QE;g;B \ argminq2C
P
s2Sbsqs is guaranteed by Lemma A.1 of HK stated below. Since a 2 u  JgB;
P
s2Sbsq
g
s PP
s2Sasq
g
s by deﬁnition of QE,g,B. Thus minq2C
P
s2Sasqs ¼ o ¼
P
s2Sbsq
g
s ¼
P
s2Sasq
g
s and so a is an element of the r.h.s. In Step
3.2.C, the ﬁrst intersection produces the measures in argminq2C
P
s2Sbsqs, and the remaining intersections ensure member-
ship in QE,g,B. Given qg 2 QE;g;B \ argminq2C
P
s2Sbsqs, the ﬁrst intersection in Step 3.2.D results in the setbJ  extðfa 2 u  Bjf ¼ g on Ec and Ps2Sasqgs ¼ ogÞ. The remaining intersections in Step 3.2.D result in the set
J ¼ ext co bJ \ a 2 RjSjj8q 2 C; Ps2Sas qs  qgsð ÞP 0  	h i ¼ ext u  JgB . The fact that in Step 3.2.D, it sufﬁces to apply a ﬁnite
number of intersections (8q 2 C and not "q 2 C) follows from Proposition A.1. Next observe that since
KE;g;BE ¼ QE;g;BE \ q 2 CEj
P
s2Sðas  bsÞqs ¼ 0; 8a 2 u  JgB
 
; KE ¼ ext KE;g;BE
 	
. Again, by Proposition A.1, it is sufﬁcient in Step
3.2.E to compute a ﬁnite number of intersections (8a 2 J and not8a 2 u  JgB). Finally, by deﬁnition of UDC\PFImax and Proposi-
tion A.1, CE,g,B is the intersection of CE and the sets q 2 CEj
P
s2Sðas  b2ÞqðsÞP 0
 
for all a 2 J.Lemma A.1 (HK, p. 288, Lemma 3). For ð%; E; g;BÞ 2 T ; QE;g;B \ argminq2C
R ðu  gÞdq – ;.
The following proposition is needed for the proof of Proposition 3.3.
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from thRE;g;B ¼ QE;g;B \ argmin
q2C
ðu  gÞdq;and RE;g;BE be the set of Bayesian conditionals on E of measures in R
E,g,B (see the proof of Proposition 3.1 for the deﬁnition of
QE,g,B).Notation A.2. Given E and h 2 A, deﬁne the set of acts comparable and indifferent to h to be
Jh ¼ ff 2 Ajf  h and f ¼ h on Ecg:Proposition A.2. UDC\RAmax is the update rule in UBayes such that5CE;g;B ¼ qE q 2 C and
Z
ðu  f ÞdqE P min
p2RE;g;BE
Z
ðu  gÞdp for all f 2 Jg

( )
:Moreover, if uðXÞ ¼ R,CE;g;B ¼ co
qEjq 2 argmin
p2C
R
u  hð Þdp for some h 2 Jg
and; for that h;
R ðu  hÞdqE P min
p2RE;g;BE
R ðu  gÞdp
8><>:
9>=>;:Deﬁnition A.2. An act f0 is convexly related to an act f on E if $x 2 X, k 2 [0,1] such that f0 = kf + (1  k)x or f = kf0 + (1  k)x on E.Proof of Proposition A.2. The proof for the ﬁrst characterization follows an argument similar to the one in the proof of
Proposition 5 in HK (p. 291) with RE,g,B playing the role of KE,g,B. To prove the second characterization, let
D0E;g;B ¼ qEjq 2 argminp2C
R ðu  f Þdp for some f 2 Jg and; for that f ; R ðu  f ÞdqE Pminp2RE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdpn o. Let C0E;g;B ¼ coðD0E;g;BÞ.
For any r 2 RE;g;B; rE 2D0E;g;B. Consider qE 2D0E;g;B and associated act f 2 Jg and q2 argminp2C
R ðu  f Þdp such thatR ðu  f ÞdqEPminp2RE;g;BE R ðu gÞdp. For such q and f and any h 2 Jg,Z Z Z Zðu  hÞdqPmin
p2C
ðu  hÞdp ¼min
p2C
ðu  f Þdp ¼ ðu  f Þdq;thus
R ðu  hÞdqE P R ðu  f ÞdqE P minp2RE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdp. Since these inequalities are preserved under convex combinations and
closure, C0E;g;B#CE;g;B and minp2C0E;g;B
R ðu  gÞdp ¼minp2CE;g;B R ðu  gÞdp. Moreover, we show that CE;g;B#C0E;g;B. Suppose that
C0E;g;B – CE;g;B. Since both sets are convex, there exists q^ 2 CE;g;B n C0E;g;B on the boundary of CE,g,B. Thus there exists f^ 2 Jg such
that q^ 2 argminp2CE;g;B
R ðu  f^ Þdp. Since q^ R C0E;g;B, there exists such f^ for which R ðu  f^ Þdq^ < minp2C0E;g;B R ðu  f^ Þdp. If there exists
h 2 Jg convexly related to f^ on E such that minp2C0E;g;B
R ðu  hÞdp ¼minp2CE;g;B R ðu  gÞdp then R ðu  hÞdq^ < minp2C0E;g;B R ðu  hÞdp ¼
minp2CE;g;B
R ðu  gÞdp, contradicting q^ 2 CE;g;B. Thus for any h 2 Jg convexly related to f^ on E; minp2C0E;g;B R ðu  hÞdp >
minp2CE;g;B
R ðu  gÞdp. Therefore for any such h and q 2 argminp2C R ðu  hÞdp; R ðu  hÞdqE > minp2CE;g;B R ðu  gÞdp. Thus
qE 2 D0E;g;B. It follows that minp2C0E;g;B
R ðu  hÞdp ¼ minp2C R ðu  hÞdpE by Lemma A.2. But then, minp2C R ðu  hÞdpE >
minp2CE;g;B
R ðu  gÞdp, a contradiction. Therefore C0E;g;B ¼ CE;g;B, as required. h
Lemma A.2. Fix any f 2 Jg and let Cf ¼ q 2 argminp2C
R ðu  hÞdpjh 2 Jg convexly related to f on E . If uðXÞ ¼ R, then
infp2Cf
R ðu  f ÞdpE ¼ minp2C R ðu  f ÞdpE.
Proof. If u  f is constant on E, then C ¼ argminp2C
R ðu  f ÞdpE and the lemma is trivially true. For the rest of the proof, we
assume u  f non-constant on E. For such an act f 2 Jg, deﬁne the function b : ð0;1Þ ! R at each a > 0 by the solution to
minp2C
R ðaðu  f Þ þ bðaÞÞEðu  gÞdp ¼minp2C R ðu  gÞdp. Such a function is well-deﬁned because p(E) > 0 for all p 2 C, and thus
the left-hand side is strictly monotonic in b(a). Now deﬁne the function q : (0,1)? C such that, for
a > 0; qðaÞ 2 argminp2C
R ðaðu  f Þ þ bðaÞÞEðu  gÞdp. We denote q(a) by qa. First we show that R ðu  f ÞdqaE is non-increasing
with a. Let a1 > a2 > 0. Thenthout the assumption uðXÞ ¼ R, the set argminp2C
R ðu  gÞdp should be replaced everywhere with its superset q 2 Cj R ðu  f ÞdqP
dq for all f 2 Jgg. As can be shown (proof available from the authors upon request), under the assumption uðXÞ ¼ R, the Bayesian conditionals formed
e two sets are the same. Notice that the latter set depends on E while the former does not.
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ða1ðu  f Þ þ bða1ÞÞEðu  gÞdqa1 ¼
Z
ða2ðu  f Þ þ bða2ÞÞEðu  gÞdqa2 6
Z
ða2ðu  f Þ þ bða2ÞÞEðu  gÞdqa1 ;so ða1  a2Þ
R
Eðu  f Þdqa1 6 ½bða2Þ  bða1Þ
qa1 ðEÞ. Similarly, ða2  a1Þ
R
Eðu  f Þdqa2 6 ½bða1Þ  bða2Þ
qa2 ðEÞ. Thus
R ðu  f Þdqa2E P
bða2Þbða1Þ
a1a2 P
R ðu  f Þdqa1E , establishing that R ðu  f ÞdqaE is non-increasing with a. By observing that it is bounded, it follows that
infa>0
R ðu  f ÞdqaE  exists and equals lima!1 R ðu  f ÞdqaE .
By deﬁnition of b(a) and qa, for a > 0,0 ¼ 1
aqaðEÞ minp2C
Z
ðaðu  f Þ þ bðaÞÞEðu  gÞdpminp2C
Z
ðu  gÞdp
 
¼
Z
ðu  f ÞdqaE þ
bðaÞ
a
þ 1
aqaðEÞ
Z
Ec
ðu  gÞdqa min
p2C
Z
ðu  gÞdp
 
:From this, lima!1
R ðu  f ÞdqaE  ¼ lima!1  bðaÞa  1aqaðEÞ REc ðu  gÞdqa minp2C R ðu  gÞdp n o. Since REc ðu  gÞdqa is bounded,
lima!1 1aqaðEÞ
R
Ec ðu  gÞdqa minp2C
R ðu  gÞdp n o ¼ 0, and therefore, lima!1 R ðu  f ÞdqaE  ¼ lima!1f bðaÞa g. From
minp2C
R ðaðu  f Þ þ bðaÞÞEðu  gÞdp ¼minp2C R ðu  gÞdp, subtracting b(a) from each state and dividing by a gives
min
p2C
Z
ðu  f ÞE
ðu  gÞ  bðaÞ
a
 
dp ¼ 1
a
min
p2C
Z
ðu  gÞdp bðaÞ
 
: ðA:1ÞTaking the limit as a?1 on both sides of (A.1),min
p2C
Z
ðu  f ÞE lima!1 
bðaÞ
a

  
dp ¼ lim
a!1
 bðaÞ
a

 
;solim
a!1
 bðaÞ
a

 
¼ min
p2C
Z
ðu  f ÞdpE:Hence infa>0
R ðu  f ÞdqaE  ¼ minp2C R ðu  f ÞdpE. If uðXÞ ¼ R, then acts ha such that u  ha = (a(u  f) + b(a))E(u  g) exist for all
a > 0 and each such ha is convexly related to f on E and ha 2 Jg. Therefore, in this case, infp2Cf
R ðu  f ÞdpE ¼ infa>0 R ðu  f ÞdqaE 
and the lemma is proved. hProof of Proposition 3.3. If q(E) = 1 for all q 2 C, then Step 3.3.D produces coðCEÞ ¼ coðCÞ, which by inspection of DC and RA,
are the updated beliefs produced by UDC\RAmax in this case. From here on, suppose q(E) < 1 for some q 2 C. Let xEc 2 X be a
constant act for which uðxEc Þ ¼ REc ðu  gÞdqEc . We need to prove that CE,g,B has as members the Bayesian updates qE of all
q 2 C satisfying (1) q(E) 6 qg(E) if g  xEc , (2) q(E)P qg(E) if xEc  g, or (3) no further restrictions if g  xEc . We use the second
description of CE,g,B presented in Proposition A.2. We ﬁrst show that measures q that violate (1)–(3) are not updated. Let f 2 Jg
and let q 2 argminp2C
R ðu  f Þdp. Also let b3 minp2RE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdp, i.e. b3 ¼ R ðu  gÞdqgE. Observe that since
qg 2 RE;g;B; qg 2 argminp2C
R ðu  gÞdp. Also note that xEc % g implies that b3 6 uðxEc Þ, which is immediate if qg(E) = 1, and fol-
lows also when qg(E) < 1 because 0P
R ðu  gÞdqg  REc ðu  gÞdqgEc ¼ REðu  gÞdqg  qg ðEÞqg ðEcÞ REc ðu  gÞdqg ¼ qgðEÞ REðu  gÞdqgE
uðxEc ÞÞ. Adding f 2 Jg, we have0 ¼min
p2C
Z
ðu  f Þdpmin
p2C
Z
ðu  gÞdp ¼
Z
E
ðu  f Þdqþ
Z
Ec
ðu  gÞdq
 

Z
E
ðu  gÞdqg þ
Z
Ec
ðu  gÞdqg
 
¼ qðEÞ
Z
E
ðu  f ÞdqE  uðxE
c Þ
 
þ uðxEc Þ
 
 qgðEÞ b3  uðxE
c Þ
 	
þ uðxEc Þ
h i
¼ qðEÞ
Z
E
ðu  f ÞdqE  uðxE
c Þ
 
 qgðEÞ b3  uðxE
c Þ
 	
by hypothesis. So qðEÞ REðu  f ÞdqE  uðxEc Þ  ¼ qgðEÞ b3  uðxEc Þ  6 0. Thus, if g  xEc , then REðu  f ÞdqE ¼ uðxEc Þ ¼ b3 ¼
minp2RE;g;BE
R ðu  gÞdp. If xEc  g, all inequalities are strict and thus REðu  f ÞdqE Pminp2RE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdp() qðEÞP qgðEÞ. A sim-
ilar argument implies that if g  xEc ; REðu  f ÞdqE Pminp2RE;g;BE R ðu  gÞdp() qðEÞ 6 qgðEÞ. We now show that measures q that
satisfy (1)-(3) are updated. First note that for any f 2 A such that f = g on Ec and q 2 C,Z
ðu  f Þdq ¼
Z
E
ðu  f Þdqþ qðEcÞuðxEc Þ ¼
Z
u  fExEc
 	
dq: ðA:2ÞIf g  xEc , then by taking f ¼ xEcE g and using equality (A.2) above we get f  g and so f 2 Jg, and moreover
8q 2 C; q 2 argminp2C
R ðu  f Þdp. So "q 2 C, qE 2 CE,g,B, thus establishing (3). To prove (2), Suppose that xEc  g. Note that
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sider q such that 9= ~q 2 C; k > 1 : ~qðFÞ ¼ kqðFÞ; 8F# E. By Lemma A.3 which is proven below, for such q, if q(E)P qg(E), then
there exists f 2 A constant on Ec, such that q 2 argminq02coðC[DðEcÞÞ
R ðu  f Þdq0. So R ðu  f Þdq 6 uðf ðEcÞÞ since
D(Ec) # co(C [ D(Ec)). By closure of CE,g,B it is sufﬁcient to consider the case of strict inequality, so
0 >
R ððu  f Þ  uðf ðEcÞÞÞdq ¼ bðminp2C R ðu  gÞdp uðxEc ÞÞ for some b > 0. Let fExEc 2 A be such that
u  fExEc ¼ 1b ððu  f Þ  uðf ðEcÞÞÞ þ uðxE
c Þ. Thus q 2 argminq02C
R
u  fExEc
 
dq0 and
R
u  fExEc
 
dq ¼ minp2C
R ðu  gÞdp, so
fExE
c  g, which by equality (A.2) implies that fEg  g. Denoting f0 = fEg, we get f0 2 Jg. ThenR
E u  f 0ð ÞdqE Pminp2RE;g;BE
R ðu  gÞdp by q(E)P qg(E) and the property initially proved, so qE 2 CE,g,B.
The proof of case (1), where g  xEc , is similar with the change (in Lemma A.3 and in the rest of the proof) that q satisﬁes
q(E) 6 qg(E) and 9= ~q 2 C; k 2 ½0;1Þ : ~qðFÞ ¼ kqðFÞ;8F# E, and co(C [ D(Ec)) is replaced by C0  {kq00 + (1  k)g : q00 2 C, g 2 D(Ec),
kP 1}. Thus 9f 0 2 A constant on Ec such that q 2 argminq02C0
R
u  f 0ð Þdq0, so R ðu  f Þdq > uðf ðEcÞÞsince f0 separates C0 from
D(Ec) and then 0 <
R ððu  f Þ  uðf ðEcÞÞÞdq ¼ bðminp2C R ðu  gÞdp uðxEc ÞÞ for some b > 0. hLemma A.3. Let q 2 C such that 9= ~q 2 C; k > 1 : ~qðFÞ ¼ kqðFÞ;8F# E. Then there exists an act f 2 A which is constant on Ec, such
that q 2 argminq02coðC[DðEcÞÞ
R ðu  f Þdq0.
Proof of Lemma A.3. If q(E) = 1, then any f 2 A such that u  f = 0E1 sufﬁces, because
R ðu  f Þdq0 P 0 for all
q0 2 co(C [D(Ec)) and R ðu  f Þdq ¼ 0. From here on, suppose q(E) < 1. Consider the set W(q)  {q0 : q0(F) = q(F), "F # E}
(note that C \W(q)– ;). First assume Int(co(C [ D(Ec))) \W(q)– ;, i.e. there exists an interior point of co(C [ D(Ec)),
q00, which satisﬁes q00(F) = q(F), "F # E. Then 9 > 0 : ~q  ð1þ Þq00   0; . . . ;0|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
E
;
1
Ec
  ; . . . ; 1Ec |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Ec
0BBB@
1CCCA 2 coðC [ DðEcÞÞ. Setting
k = 1 +  > 1, we get ~qðFÞ ¼ kqðFÞ; 8F# E, which contradicts the initial condition. So Int(co(C [ D(Ec))) \W(q) = ;.
Thus there exists a hyperplane H which contains W(q) and supports co(C [D(Ec)) at any point in co(C [ D(Ec)) \W(q).
Let us now take a normal u  f to H. Since H contains W(q), it must be true that R ðu  f Þdðq q0Þ ¼ 0 for all
q0 2W(q). So0 ¼
Z
ðu  f Þdq
Z
ðu  f Þdq0 ¼
Z
Ec
ðu  f Þdq
Z
Ec
ðu  f Þdq0;since q and q0 are identical on E. Thus
R
Ec ðu  f Þdq0 is constant regardless of the choice of q0. Let s 2 Ec, and let q0sbe such that
q0sðFÞ ¼
qðFÞ; F# E
qðEcÞ; s 2 F# Ec


, so q0s 2 WðqÞ; 8s 2 Ec . Thus 8s; s^ 2 Ec , we have
R
Ec ðu  f Þdq0s ¼
R
Ec ðu  f Þdq0s^ ) u  f ðsÞ ¼ u  f ðs^Þ,
i.e. u  f is constant on Ec and therefore f can be chosen to be constant on Ec. hAlgorithm 4.1 (Step 3.3.D0). Fix some n 2 (0,1). Let A ¼ ;. For each pair q1; q2 2 C, solve the linear program,
max
a2RjEj
K0 
X
s2E
ðas  b3Þq2s ;
s:t:X
s2S
ðaEbÞsqs P o 8q 2 C;
X
s2S
ðaEbÞs nq1s þ ð1 nÞq2s
  ¼ o;
X
s2E
ðas  b3Þq1s P 0;
ðPÞwhere b3 
P
s2Ebs q
g
E
 
s and K
0 = 1 if KP 0 and K0 = 1 if K < 0, for K  o Ps2S½ðb31ÞEb
s nq1s þ ð1 nÞq2s .
Consider only pairs (q1,q2) for which (P⁄) is feasible. If (P⁄) is unbounded, then add n q1 + (1  n)q2 to A. Otherwise, let
a⁄ 2 argmax(P⁄). If Ps2E as  b3 q2s P 0, then add q1, q2 to A. Otherwise, add aðq1 ;q2Þq1 þ 1 aðq1 ;q2Þ 	q2 to A, where
aðq1 ;q2Þ ¼
P
s2E a

sb3ð Þq2sP
s2E a

sb3ð Þ q2s q1sð Þ. Compute UE  extðfqEjq 2 AÞ. Return coðUEÞ.Proposition A.3. If uðXÞ ¼ R, Algorithm 3.3 with Step 3.3.D0 replacing Step 3.3.D0 results in the updated set of measures, CE,g,B,
produced by the update rule UDC\RAmax.
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q 2 argminp2C
P
s2Sasps for some a 2 u  Jg
 
will be referred to as condition 1. For qwhich satisfy condition 1 with the vector
a, the condition
P
s2EasðqEÞs P b3 minp2RE;g;B
E
P
s2Ebsps
h i
will be referred to as condition 2. The following proposition eluci-
dates the geometric properties of the updated beliefs.
Proposition A.4. If uðXÞ ¼ R; CE;g;B for UDC\RAmax equals the convex hull of Bayesian conditionals of
(a) Extreme points of C satisfying conditions 1 and 2.
(b) Non-extreme Boundary points of C which are convex combinations of two extreme points satisfying condition 1 with the
same vector a, and for which condition 2 is satisﬁed with an equality.Proof of Proposition A.4. Denote by D the set of measures satisfying (a) or (b). Let CE ¼ fqjq 2 argminp2C
P
s2Sasps for some
a 2 u  Jg and Ps2Eðas  b3Þqs P 0g. Since condition 2 is equivalent to Ps2Eðas  b3Þqs P 0; D#CE, thus co(D) # co(CE). We
will show that co(D) = co(CE). We ﬁrst show that an updated boundary point must be a proper (positive weight) convex com-
bination of extreme points of C satisfying condition 1 with the same a. Any such boundary point q can be expressed as a
proper convex combination of a set A of extreme points of C, i.e. q ¼Pi2Akiqi. Suppose that q satisﬁes condition 1 using
the vector a and assume by contradiction that
P
s2Sasq
j
s > minp2C
P
s2Sasps ¼
P
s2Sasqs for some j 2 A. ThenP
s2Sasq
0
s <
P
s2Sasqs for q
0  11kj
P
i2Anfjgkiq
i, contradicting q 2 argminp2C
P
s2Sasps. Thus q
i 2 argminp2C
P
s2Sasps for all i 2 A.
Next we show that for each edge (convex hull of two extreme points entirely on the boundary) of C, the subset of updated
points in this edge is convex. By the arguments above, it is sufﬁcient to consider the case where both the edge’s vertices sat-
isfy condition 1. Let R be an edge of C, such that one of its vertices, q1, satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2, and the other, q2, satisﬁes
only condition 1. If no point in R other than q1, q2 satisﬁes condition 1, then only q1 gets updated, so this forms a convex set.
Now suppose that there exists a point in R other than q1, q2 satisfying condition 1. Let P(R) denote the set
a 2 u  ff 2 A with f ¼ g on Ecgjq0 2 argminp2CPs2Sasps for all q0 in Rg. By the arguments above, P(R) is non-empty. For
each a 2 P(R), there exists a half-space Ps2Eðas  b3Þqs P 0 corresponding to condition 2. This half-space does not contain
the entire edge R, for if it did, every point in R would get updated, contrary to our assumption. So the intersection between
the half-space and R must be a set of the form aq1 þ ð1 aÞq2jaaR 6 a 6 1
 
(the weak inequality follows from closure of
CE,g,B), where aaR > 0 is the weight satisfying
P
s2Eðas  b3Þ aaRq1s þ 1 aaR
 
q2s
  ¼ 0. Each vector a 2 P(R) has a unique corre-
sponding weight aaR. Thus the set of points in R which are updated is aq1 þ ð1 aÞq2jaR 6 a 6 1
 
, where aR  infa2PðRÞaaR.
This set is convex. Now consider a facet Q (convex hull of at least three extreme points entirely on the boundary) of C such
that all of its vertices satisfy condition 1, and some vertices, but not all, satisfy condition 2. Let D1(Q) denote the set of
updated extreme points of Q, and let D2(Q) denote the set of points of the form aRq1 þ 1 aR
 
q2 in Q. We show that the
set of points of Q which are updated is exactly co(D2(Q) [ D1(Q)), implying that co(D) = co(CE). As we have seen above, it is
impossible for a point to be updated, which is of the form a q1 + (1  a)q2, where q1 and q2 are the vertices of an edge R
of Q, q2 does not satisfy condition 2, and a < aR, so assume int[Qnco(D2(Q) [ D1(Q))] is non-empty. Consider a point
q 2 int[Qnco(D2(Q) [ D1(Q))], and assume by contradiction that q is updated. Then there exists a vector a 2 u  {f 2 Bjf = g
on Ec} such that q 2 argminp2C
P
s2Sasps and
P
s2Eðas  b3Þqs P 0. It follows from the same argument used earlier, that any
q0 2 Q also belongs to argminp2C
P
s2Sasps. Moreover, the half-space corresponding to condition 2 intersects any edge R of
Q in co(D2(Q) [ D1(Q)), so the half-space intersects the whole facet Q in co(D2(Q) [ D1(Q)). But this contradicts the assumption
on q, completing the proof. hProof of Proposition A.3. By construction of qgE; b3 ¼minp2RE;g;BE
R ðu  gÞdp. Denote Ps2Eðas  b3Þq1s by h1(a) andP
s2Eðas  b3Þq2s by h2(a). The following is proved based on Proposition A.4.
(1) If q1 = q2, we show that (P⁄) is bounded and moreover q1 = q2 is updated if and only if (P⁄) is feasible with non-negative
value. Since the second constraint in (P⁄) implies that K = h2(a), h2(a) is ﬁxed, so the program is bounded. Assume it is
feasible. The ﬁrst and second constraints mean that there exists a vector aEb such that q1 ¼ q2 2
argminp2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsps. The second constraint means that minq2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsqs ¼ o, hence aEb 2 u  Jg and condition 1
holds. The third constraint means that condition 2 holds for q1 = q2, thus q1 = q2 is updated. On the other hand, if
q1 = q2 is updated, it follows immediately from conditions 1 and 2 that (P⁄) is feasible.
(2) If q1– q2, there are several mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases:
a. If q1, q2 fail to satisfy condition 1 with the same a (whether or not they are updated), we show that (P⁄) is infea-sible. Assume by contradiction that (P⁄) is feasible. Then verity of the ﬁrst and second constraints means that there
exists a vector aEb 2 u  ff 2 A with f = g on Ec} such that nq1 þ ð1 nÞq2 2 argminp2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsps, and so due to
arguments shown in the proof of Proposition A.4, both q1, q2 belong to argminp2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsps. Verity of the second
constraint means that minp2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsps ¼ o, so q1, q2 satisfy condition 1 with the same a – a contradiction.
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lows again from contradiction of the third constraint.
c. If only q1 is updated and q2 satisﬁes condition 1 with equal a but violates condition 2, observe the following. First, by
the same arguments as above, (P⁄) is feasible. We minimize aaR for R = co{q
1,q2} (see the proof of Proposition A.4). Since
K = nh1(a) + (1  n)h2(a), we have h1ðaÞ ¼ 1n ðK  ð1 nÞh2ðaÞÞ. Thus
P
s2Eðas  b3ÞðaaRq1s þ ð1 aaRÞq2s Þ ¼ 0 impliesaaR ¼
P
s2Eðas  b3Þq2sP
s2Eðas  b3Þ q2s  q1s
  ¼ h2ðaÞ
h2ðaÞ  h1ðaÞ ¼
h2ðaÞ
h2ðaÞ  Kn þ 1nn h2ðaÞ
¼ nh2ðaÞ
h2ðaÞ  K :By the assumption on q1 and q2, for all feasible a, h1(a)P 0 and h2(a) < 0. Consequently K could be of any sign, depend-
ing on the choice of n, so the behavior of the above expression as a function of h2(a) depends on the sign of K. If KP 0
(and so K0 = 1), then the function is non-increasing, so minimization of aaR is equivalent to maximization of K
0  h2(a). If
K < 0 (thus K0 = 1), the function is increasing, so minimization of aaR is equivalent to minimization of h2(a), or, again,
maximization of K0  h2(a). Observe that aaR 2 ð0; n
 for all feasible a iff KP 0, in which case the problem is bounded
from above by 0, otherwise there would exist a0 for which h2(a0)P 0, contradicting the assumption on q2. Similarly,
aaR 2 ðn;1
 for all feasible a iff K < 0. If the problem is not bounded, h1(a) tends to 1and h2(a) tends to 1. Then
nh2ðaÞ
h2ðaÞK tends to n (from above), which means that a

ðq1 ;q2Þ  infa2Pðq1 ;q2ÞaaR ¼ n.
d. If q1, q2 are updated with equal a, we show that KP 0, and (P⁄) is feasible and bounded with non-negative value. To
see that, ﬁrst observe that K = nh1(a) + (1  n)h2(a), and h1(a), h2(a)P 0, so KP 0. Since q1 and q2 satisfy condition 1
with the same a, and since aEb 2 u  Jg, the second constraint holds. The fact that both q1, q2 belong to
argminp2C
P
s2SðaEbÞsps implies
P
s2SðaEbÞsq1s 6
P
s2SðaEbÞsqis; 8qi 2 C and
P
s2SðaEbÞsq2s 6
P
s2SðaEbÞsqis; 8qi, soP
s2SðaEbÞs nq1 þ ð1 nÞq2
 
s 6
P
s2SðaEbÞsqis; 8qi, i.e. the ﬁrst constraint holds. The third constraint holds because q1
is updated. Thus a is feasible and so (P⁄) is feasible. Since the second constraint holds, K = nh1(a) + (1  n)h2(a), and
since h1(a)P 0, h2(a) is bounded from above, and so the program is bounded. Note that since KP 0, K0 = 1 and the
program results in a⁄ such that
P
s2Eðas  b3Þq2s P 0. h
Appendix B. Algorithms from polyhedral theory
This appendix includes several algorithms, known from polyhedral theory [8], that can be used within the algorithms for
computing updated beliefs.
B.1. The irredundancy problem; or, extracting a set’s extreme points
Given a ﬁnite set H#RjSj, the following algorithm can be used to compute the set ext[co(H)].
Algorithm B.1. If jHj 6 2, return H. Otherwise, for each h 2 H, apply the linear feasibility program, with variable a 2 [0,1]jHj,P
h2Hnh
ahhs ¼ hs; 8s 2 S;P
h2Hnh
ah ¼ 1
ðPðhÞÞand return {h 2 HjP(h) is infeasible}.B.2. A general algorithm for computing an intersection
Let A#RjSj be a convex, compact set such that ext(A) is ﬁnite. The following algorithm ﬁnds the set of extreme points of
the intersection of A with a ﬁnite collection of half spaces Wn
k
ak
n or
k¼1
.
Algorithm B.2. Set k ¼ 1; Dk ¼ extðAÞ. Apply the following subroutine:
(i) Let Dk1 ¼ c 2 Dkjak  cP nk
n o
; Dk2 ¼ c ¼ n
kak c2
ak ðc1c2Þ ðc1  c2Þ þ c2jðc1; c2Þ 2 ðDkÞ
2
; ak  c1  nk
 	
 ðak  c2  nkÞ < 0
n o
.
(ii) Find Ek  ext co Dk1 [ Dk2
 	h i
using Algorithm B.1.
(iii) If k = r stop and return E ¼ Er . Otherwise let Dkþ1 ¼ Ek; k ¼ kþ 1. Return to (i).Lemma B.1. Let A and D be convex sets such that A \ D is compact. Then any extreme point of A \ D is either an extreme point of A
or D, or it belongs to the boundaries of both A and D.
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(say D), there exists a neighborhood Be(c) of c such that Be(c)  D. Since c is not an extreme point of A, there exist c1,
c2 2 A \ Be(c) such that c is a convex combination of c1 and c2. But A \ Be(c)  A \ D, so c cannot be an extreme point of
A \ D – a contradiction. hProposition B.1. Algorithm B.2 ﬁnds the set of extreme points of A\rk¼1Wn
k
ak .Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that iteration k results in the set of extreme points of A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj . Consider D
k, the set of extreme
points of A\k1j¼1Wn
j
aj , and consider the half-space W
nk
ak . For all c 2 Dk2; ak  c ¼ n
kak c2
ak ðc1c2Þ a
k  ðc1  c2Þ þ ak  c2 ¼ nk. Thus members
of Dk2 lie on the boundary of A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj . In addition, any q 2 Dk1 is clearly in A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj , so E
k#A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj . Since A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj is a con-
vex set, it follows that coðEkÞ#A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj . Assume by contradiction that A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj  coðEkÞ. Since both A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj and coðEkÞ are
compact, there exists an extreme point c0 of A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj such that c
0 R coðEkÞ. c0 cannot be an extreme point of A\k1j¼1Wn
j
aj , since
then it would have belonged to Dk1# E
k. Thus, by Lemma B.1, c0 belongs to the intersection of the boundaries ofA\k1j¼1Wn
j
aj and
Wn
k
ak , so it must belong to the hyperplane H
nk
ak  fc 2 RjSj jak  c ¼ nkg. c0 cannot be a convex combination of two points in Dk,
because then it would have belonged to Dk2. Moreover, c
0 R coðDkÞ, because then Hnkak would include other such combinations
which are therefore in A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj ; c
0 being their convex combination – a contradiction. Thus c0 R A\k1j¼1Wn
j
aj , a contradiction. It
follows that A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj # coðEkÞ, thus coðEkÞ ¼ A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj . Since E
k ¼ ext½coðEkÞ
; Ek ¼ ext A\kj¼1Wn
j
aj
 	
. Note that it is possible that
the intersection sought is empty, in which case Dk1 and D
k
2 are empty for all iteration starting from some iteration k
0. hCorollary B.1. To ﬁnd the set of extreme points of A\rk¼1Hn
k
ak , Algorithm B.2 can be used with the change that
Dk1 ¼ fc 2 Dkjak  c ¼ nkg. Alternatively, one can use Algorithm B.2 to ﬁnd the set of extreme points of A\rk¼1Wn
k
ak\rk¼1Wn
k
ak .
Appendix C. Supplementary Code
Code for an implementation of the algorithms in the paper using Wolfram Mathematica is available as an Online Supple-
ment at doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2011.06.010 on the journal webpage or from the authors.
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